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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
LOCAL ZONING ORDINANCE VIOLAnVE OF EQUAL PROTECTION

Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre
Local authorities traditionally have been given broad discretion in
zoning matters. 1 As long as the exercise of this power does not constitute an arbitrary deprivation of a property right, a wide range of zoning objectives may be accomplished.2 Zoning ordinances usually are
evaluated in terms of constitutional due process, that is, in terms of
their substantial relationship to the purposes of the police power:
public health, safety, morals, and welfare. 3 However, in instances where
ordinances involve neither the traditional use nor area restrictions, but
deal in classifications of persons, the equal protection clause also comes
into play. This was the case in Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre4 wherein
the Second Circuit found an ordinance which distinguished between
family groups related by blood, marriage, or adoption and unrelated
groups living as a family unit violative of the equal protection clause.
Belle Terre is an incorporated village within the town of Brookhaven, Long Island, and is in close proximity to the State University
at Stony Brook. The village is zoned exclusively for one-family residences. These are defined in the zoning ordinance as detached buildings used for the residence of one family, and exclude a "lodging house,
1 See, e.g., Garrity v. District of Columbia, 86 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1936); Thomas v.
Town of Bedford, 11 N.Y.2d 428, 184 N.E.2d 285, 230 N.Y.S.2d 684 (1962); New Haven &
Hartford R.R. Co. v. Sulla, 198 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1960).
2 N.Y. ViLLAGE LAw § 7-704 (McKinney 1973), enumerates several such objectives:
to lessen congestion in the streets; to secure safety from fire, panic, floods and
other dangers; to promote health and the general welfare; to provide adequate
light and air; to prevent the overcrowding of land; to avoid undue concentration of population; to facilitate the adequate provision of transportation, water,
sewerage, schools, parks and other public requirements.
See Katobimar Realty Co. v. Webster, 20 N.J. 114, 118 A.2d 824 (1955); 6 R. PowELL,
THE LAw OF REAL PROPERTY ff 867 (P. Rohan ed. 1971). New York also allows zoning for
aesthetic purposes. Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 NYE.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22
(1967).
8 Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 US. 183 (1928); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Concordia Collegiate Institute v. Miller, 301 N.Y. 189, 93 N.E.2d
632 (1950); Incorporated Village of Westbury v. Samuels, 46 Misc. 2d 633, 260 N.Y.S.2d
369 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1965); Incorporated Village of Brookville v. Paulgene
Realty Corp., 24 Misc. 2d 790, 200 N.Y.S.2d 126 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1960), aff'd,
14 App. Div. 2d 575, 218 N.Y.S.2d 264 (2d Dep't 1961), af'd, 11 N.Y.2d 672, 180 N.E.2d
905, 225 N.Y.S.2d 750 (1962); N.Y. VILLAGE LAw § 7-700 (McKinney 1973).
4476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973), prob. juris. noted, 42 U.S.L.W. 8213 (US. Oct. 15,
1973) (No. 73-191).
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boarding house, fraternity house, sorority house or multiple dwelling."5
The village ordinance defines "family" as:
One or more persons related by blood, adoption or marriage, living
and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit... a number
of persons but not exceeding two (2) living and cooking together
as a single housekeeping unit though not related by blood, adoption, or marriage shall be deemed to constitute a family. 6
Edwin and Judith Dickman are homeowners in Belle Terre who
leased their six-bedroom house to Michael Truman, a doctoral candidate at Stony Brook, in December of 1971. Truman was joined by
two other students, Bruce Boraas and Anne Parish, in June of 1972.
Shortly thereafter three other students moved into the house. The six
students were not related but were joined by a mutual interest in
graduate studies. Seeking an economic alternative to dormitory living,
they formed a single housekeeping unit in the Dickman house. Rent
and household chores were shared, community meals were eaten, and
7
a common treasury was organized.
In June 1972, the students applied for a beach permit as village
residents." Within a few weeks the Dickmans received a summons
ordering them to comply with the ordinance, presumably by evicting
the "illegal tenants," or be subject to a penalty.9
Alleging a violation of their constitutional rights, the Dickmans
brought a section 1988 action in the district court, seeking injunctive
relief.' 0 The Dickmans were joined by three of the students in the
action. The student plaintiffs contended that the ordinance violated
their constitutional rights of privacy and association."' They also
2
claimed infringement of their right to travel.'
District Judge Dooling issued a temporary restraining order pending a hearing on the merits.' 3 At the hearing on plaintiffs' motion for a
5 Village of Belle Terre, Building Zone Ordinance art. I, § D-1.4a (1971), quoted in

476 F.2d at 809 n.1.
61d. § D-1.85a (June 8, 1970), quoted in 476 F.2d at 809.
7 476 F.2d at 809.
8 Id.
0 The penalty for breach was a fine not to exceed $100 or 60 days imprisonment
or both for each day of the violation. Village of Belle Terre, Building Zone Ordinance
art. VIII, pt. 4, § M-l.4a(2) (Oct. 17, 1971), quoted in 476 F.2d at 809.
10 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides a federal forum in cases of deprivation of constitutional rights "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or territory." See Lynch v. Snepp, 472 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1973); Russell v. Monroe,
351 F. Supp. 115 (W.D.N.Y. 1972).
11 Brief for Appellants at 8-43.
12476 F.2d at 813.
13 Id.at 812.
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preliminary injunction, the court held that there was a justiciable
controversy 14 and that the abstention doctrine was inapplicable. 15
Turning to the merits, Judge Dooling concluded that Belle Terre's
zoning ordinance was constitutional. Although he admitted that the
ordinance was not justified by traditional zoning objectives, 16 Judge
Dooling was of the view that it was justified by the village's legitimate
interest in maintaining homogeneous family group areas.' 7 The decision was appealed to the Second Circuit.
On appeal, the court, per Judge Mansfield, indicated that to be
constitutional the challenged zoning ordinance must satisfy both the
due process and equal protection clauses.' 8 The court noted that controversies involving zoning ordinances had been traditionally considered under the due process clause.19 The court cited Nectow v. City of
Cambridge20 wherein the Supreme Court stated that local zoning laws
14 The district court found that the suit was barred neither by the anti-injunction
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970), nor by Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), because no
case was then pending in the state courts to which this suit could be addressed. Boraas v.
Village of Belle Terre, Civil No. 72-1030, 12-13 (E.D.N.Y., filed Sept. 20, 1972); see Boraas
v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1973).
15 Civil No. 72-1030 at 15-24. The defendant village had contended that there were
issues of state law which should be resolved before a decision was rendered in the federal
courts. Judge Dooling concluded that due to prior New York zoning decisions, in this
case
a state court decision holding that the ordinance, construed as the village has
construed it was beyond the authority granted to the village by the New York
Village Law, could apparently be based only on the argument that to hold otherwise would impose on Section 175 and 177 of the Village Law an unconstitutional
interpretation. Any unresolved question of the state law detectable here is, therefore, the federal question differently stated.
Id. at 24. Neither Judge Dooling nor the circuit court believed that a state court would
find the zoning ordinance in Belle Terre ultra vires the New York Village Law. 476 F.2d
at 812. Judge Dooling remarked that although the New York courts have not "directly
considered the issue" here involved, "it would appear that New York does countenance
the use of a single family definition which requires the existence of blood relationship
and marriage." Civil No. 72-1030 at 20. See City of Schenectady v. Alumni Ass'n of Union
Chapter, 5 App. Div. 2d 14, 168 N.Y.S.2d 754 (3d Dep't 1957); Laporte v. City of New
Rochelle, 2 App. Div. 2d 710, 152 N.Y.S.2d 916 (2d Dep't 1956), afl'd, 2 N.Y.2d 921, 141
N.E.2d 917, 161 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1957); Town of Henrietta v. Fairchild, 53 Misc. 2d 862,
279 N.Y.S.2d 992 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1967).
16 See N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-704 (McKinney 1973); note 2 supra.
17 A one-family dwelling zoning district limited to families made up essentially of
parents and their children needs no apologia. Such zoning is simply another of
countless statutes of bounty and protection with which the states, and all of them,
and the Federal government alike aggressively surround the traditional family of
parents and their children ....

Civil No. 72-1030 at 31. The court went on to observe that due to the implications of
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), municipalities may not be able to zone out
parents and their children simply because the parents are not ceremonially married.
Civil No. 72-1030, at 31-32. However, this prohibition was not extended to groups of
unrelated adults living together as "voluntary families."
18 476 F.2d at 813.
191d. at 812-13.
20277 U.S. 183 (1928).

SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1972 TERM

must "bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals,
or general welfare" 21 in order to be deemed constitutional.
In addition to the due process standard, the ordinance must not
incorporate any classifications which violate equal protection. The
threshold question in equal protection analysis is the standard of
review to be employed. The plaintiff-appellants contended that the
ordinance impinged upon their fundamental rights of privacy, association, and travel. 22 Accordingly, they urged the court to apply a strict
scrutiny test whereby the village would have to show that the ordinance
furthered a compelling state interest.23 The appellees, on the other
hand, claimed that the ordinance could be justified in terms of control
of population density and maintenance of the character of the neighborhood. They thus considered the rational basis test the proper stan24
dard of scrutiny.
21 d. at 188.

22 Brief for Appellants at 7-43.
The right of privacy has been declared as a "penumbra" of the Bill of Rights. See
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Appellants in Belle Terre asserted an interest in protecting the privacy and sanctity of
the home. Brief for Appellants at 9-13.
Freedom of association also has been recognized as a first amendment right. Shelton
v. Tucker, 364 US. 479 (1960) (holding unconstitutional a requirement that, as a condition
of continued employment, a teacher list the associations to which he belongs); NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (requirement that NAACP membership lists be turned over
to the state held unconstitutional); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (state
may not require children to attend public schools). See notes 68-88 and accompanying
text infra.

The right to travel as a "fundamental interest" was first announced in Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). At first blush, the Belle Terre ordinance might appear
to affect the right to travel by "deterring" students from moving off campus or by
"penalizing" them for living in a communal fashion after their arrival in the community.
However, prior equal protection decisions involving violations of this right considered
statutes which used recent travel as a basis for classification: "Such laws divide residents
into two classes, old residents and new residents, and discriminate against the latter .... "
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 334 (1972). The Belle Terre ordinance has as a basis
of classification not the recent movement of the household unit but its composition.
The restriction on non-family living arrangements applied equally to newcomers and
longterm residents. The penalty is not one "imposed solely because the newcomer is a
new resident." Id. at 342 n.12.
23476 F.2d at 813. See notes 26-33 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of
the strict scrutiny test.
24 476 F.2d at 813. Support for this approach is found in Palo Alto Tenants Union
v. Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1970). The ordinance there prohibited more than
four unrelated persons from living together as one household. Plaintiffs claimed constitutionally protected rights of privacy, association, and freedom to choose their own life
style. The district court found no fundamental rights infringed and held the ordinance
to be rationally based within the meaning of the due process and equal protection
clauses. Id. at 911-12. It should be noted that Palo Alto, unlike Belle Terre, was not
exclusively zoned for single-family residences. Thus, groups of unrelated persons in Palo
Alto could legally live together in other areas of the community.
The rational basis test maximizes judicial deference to legislative classifications. The
court need only find some hypothetical, rational relationship between the legislation in
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The court began its analysis by dispensing with the compelling
state interest test.25 This standard is called into play when discriminatory legislation affects "fundamental" rights26 or creates suspect classifications such as race,27 alienage,28 lineage, 29 and now sex.30 Under this
test the state must establish that a compelling state interest or end outweighs the individual's claim to a personal right.3 ' The Belle Terre
question and a valid governmental objective in order to find it constitutional. It need
not even seek the actual purpose of the legislation. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla.,
Inc., 348 US. 483 (1955); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 US. 61 (1911).
In McGowan v. Maryland, 866 U.S. 420, 425-28 (1961), the Supreme Court upheld
the Maryland Blue Laws which allowed only certain goods to be sold on Sunday. Using
the minimum scrutiny test that Court said:
The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds
wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures
are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact
that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality.
366 U.S. at 425-26. The Court felt it possible for the legislature to believe that valid
health and recreational purposes were being served by allowing the sale of exempt goods.
This mere conjecture was sufficient to uphold the legislation. Id. at 426.
In Williamson the statute in question made it illegal for an optician to fit, duplicate,
or replace lenses without a prescription from either an ophthalmologist or optometrist.
Once the Court was satisfied that there was no invidious discrimination, it allowed the
legislators free rein to handle whatever "evils" they believed to be present. 348 U.S. at 489.
In Lindsley the Court explained the use of the test thusly:
When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts
reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of
facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed.
220 U.S. at 78 (emphasis added).
25 476 F.2d at 813-14. This test forms the second level of today's "two-tiered" review
procedure. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term- Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther]; Comment, The Evolution of Equal
Protection-Education, Municipal Services and Wealth, 7 HARv. Cxv. RGM-rs-Cv. LYB.
L REv. 103, 112-14 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Evolution]; Note, Developments in the
Law: Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. Ray. 1065, 1076-1132 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Equal Protection]. The higher standard of review was substantially developed in the
Warren Court era.
26 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel); Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956) (right of an indigent defendant to a free transcript when necessary for appellate
review).
27 Loving v. Virginia, 888 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 US. 184 (1964).
28 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
29 Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323 US. 214
(1944).
30Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). Mr. Justice Brennan was joined by
Justices Douglas, White, and Marshall in holding sex to be a suspect classification. Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Powell, and Blackmun concurred in the judgment.
81 See articles cited in note 25 supra. In evaluating the balance of personal versus
state interests, the courts will look to the necessity of the legislative means in achieving
the state's ends. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 380 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969); Westbrook v. Mihaly, 2 Cal. 3d 765, 471 P.2d 487, 87 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1970)
(en banc).
In Dunn the Supreme Court stated:
[I]f there are other, reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser burden
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court was unwilling to explore and perhaps expand the perimeter of
32
fundamental rights which would demand strict scrutiny. Judge Mansfield refused to consider the exclusionary zoning at issue as violating
any fundamental interests. Although the court indicated that the infringement on the appellants' rights to privacy and travel might warrant the operation of the strict scrutiny test, it chose to avoid these
issues.33

Notwithstanding its reluctance to find a "fundamental right," the
court was impressed by the personal and basic nature of the rights asserted and characterized them as unquestionably important. 84 Accordingly, Judge Mansfield eschewed the hypothetical legislative justification of the rational basis test in favor of an examination of the "true
rationale" supporting the ordinance. The court fashioned a meansscrutiny test to determine whether there was in fact a substantial relationship between the classification and the purpose of the statute.3 5
Support for this approach was gleaned from recent Supreme Court
decisions. Several cases decided by the Burger Court indicated some
dissatisfaction with the "two-tiered" approach 6 and appeared to be
on constitutionally protected activity, a State may not choose the way of greater
interference.

405 U.S. at 343.

In Shapiro the Court found that the primary purpose of the statutes in question was

to exclude indigents by denying welfare payments to those without a year's residency.
This was considered "constitutionally impermissible" because it infringed upon the right
to travel. 294 U.S. at 629. The Court also found that the means employed were neither
necessary nor functional in attaining even the statutes' legitimate ends. Id. at 634-88.
The California Supreme Court in Westbrookr articulated the standard as follows:
Under the strict standard applied in such cases, the state bears the burden of
establishing not only that it has a compelling interest which justifies the law but
that the distinctions drawn by the law are necessary to further its purpose.

2 Cal. 3d at 785, 471 P.2d at 500-01, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 852-53 (emphasis in original). The
priority given to rights and classifications which merit the "strict scrutiny" approach is
such that it is rare for a state to establish a compelling interest potent enough to defeat
it. Evolution, supra note 25, at 148. However, the causes recognized as evoking this active
review are limited. Gunther, supra note 25, at 12-16. See notes 26-30 and accompanying
text supra. The Supreme Court has shown reluctance to expand the list of suspect
classifications. See James v. Valtierra, 402 US. 137 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397

U.s. 471 (1970).

32476 F.2d at 813-14.
33 The court said:
Fortunately we do not have to decide whether there has been an infringement
of the right of privacy or travel because we believe that we are no longer limited
to the either-or choice between the compelling state interest test and the minimal
scrutiny permitted by the Lindsley-McGowan formula.
476 F.2d at 814.
r4Id. at 813.
a Id. at 814.
30 Gunther, supra note 25, at 17-18. "A number of Justices, from all segments of the
Court, sought formulations that would narrow the gap between the widely separated
tiers of the Warren Court's equal protection." Id. at 17.

ST. JOHN'S LAWT

REVIEW

[Vol. 48:262

nurturing a vaguely formulated, intermediate standard. 7 This standard, a more active one than the minimum scrutiny test, would be
implemented by evaluating the means employed rather than the ends
attained.88 The strict scrutiny test would still be applied where a
fundamental interest or a suspect classification was involved.
Judge Mansfield relied upon a core of five Supreme Court cases
suggestive of this third, albeit protean, trend in equal protection decisions.8 9 However, the degree of relationship between means and ends
which would validate a legislative enactment, and the mechanics of
the intermediate standard, were not consistently elucidated by these
cases. In Eisenstadt v. Baird" and Reed v. Reed,41 on which the Belle
Terre court relied most heavily, a standard just falling short of strict
scrutiny was used.42 The weighing of personal rights against state
87 Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 US. 92 (1972) (strict scrutiny applied);
James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 US. 715 (1972); Weber v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 US. 438 (1972); Reed
v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
38 Gunther, supra note 25, at 21.
89 476 F.2d 806. The cases include: James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972), Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972), Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 US. 438 (1972), and Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Of these, Weber pro.
vides the most definitive statement of the standard via a double interrogative approach:
"What legitimate state interest does the classification promote? What fundamental
personal rights might the classification endanger?" 406 U.S. at 173. Mr. Justice Rehnquist,
dissenting in Weber, characterized the Court's approach as a "hybrid" of the two recognized standards of review. He found it ideal for a legislature, but inappropriate for
judicial interpretation of equal protection. Id. at 181.
In James v. Strange and Jackson v. Indiana, without finding cause for use of the
strict scrutiny standard, the Court looked to the means employed to attain the legitimate
ends of the statutes. In both cases a determination of whether any fundamental constitutional right had been infringed was carefully avoided, yet the statutes were overturned as
violative of fourteenth amendment rights. James involved a statute allowing the state
to recover from an indigent defendant the cost of his defense. Jackson was concerned
with an Indiana statute which provided different standards for commitment of mentally
deficient defendants and incompetents not charged with crimes. Although the language
of these cases is that of the rational basis test, the methodology of review is more flexible
than that of the traditional approach. This increased judicial sensitivity may be attributable to the nature of the individual interests involved in James and Jackson.
40405 U.S. 438 (1972), Massachusetts law made it illegal for anyone but a registered
physician or a pharmacist acting on a physician's prescription to provide a contraceptive
to an unmarried person. See note 42 infra.
41404 U.S. 71 (1971). The Idaho probate code gave preference to men over women
in the same entitlement class in granting letters of administration. IDAHO CODE § 15-314
(1970).
421n Baird the controversy appeared similar to the right of privacy issue considered
in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), in which Connecticut's ban on the use
of contraceptives was found unconstitutional. The Baird Court said, however:
We need not, and do not, . . . decide that important question in this case
because, whatever the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may
be, the rights must be the same for the unmarried and the married alike.
405 US. at 453. One commentator noted that this approach served not only to avoid
the more difficult constitutional questions involved, but may have also been a tactical
consideration to obtain a majority against the statute. Gunther, supra note 25, at 34-35.
The Baird Court struck down Massachusetts' alleged public health statute by going so
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interests, characteristic of these cases, is indicative of a sliding scale
rather than a fixed standard of review.
The Belle Terre court applied this ill-defined test to the merits.
Judge Mansfield focused on the district court's finding that the village
had a legitimate interest in maintaining its nuclear family composition.
He felt that the purpose and effect of the ordinance was to exclude
people from the community because of their lifestyle. In reversing the
district court he concluded that the maintenance of a prevailing lifestyle within a community did not come within its police powers and,
hence, was not a valid zoning objective.4 3 Judge Mansfield wrote: "Although local communities are given wide latitude in achieving legitimate zoning needs, they cannot under the mask of zoning ordinances
impose social preferences of this character upon their fellow citizens." 44
The court next assumed arguendo that a valid zoning objective
existed. Applying the means scrutiny test, Judge Mansfield inquired
whether the ordinance in fact furthered the assumed objective. He
determined that for each conceivable statutory objective, the classification was overbroad and that alternative less burdensome regulations
would serve the same purposes. The court remarked:
To theorize that groups of unrelated members would have more occupants per house than would traditional family groups, or that
they would price the latter out of the market or produce greater
parking, noise or traffic problems, would be rank speculation, unsupported
either by evidence or by facts that could be judicially
4
noticed. 5
far as to disbelieve the legislature's declared purpose of moral or health considerations.

405 U.S. at 443-52. In objecting to this approach as being too aggressive for a moderately
interventionist test Professor Gunther wrote:
Intensified rationality scrutiny justifies focus on actual purposes rather than
court-conceived ones; it does not justify rejecting several properly offered state
objectives in the interest of molding the controversy into an equal protection
violation.
Gunther, supra note 25, at 35-86.
The Court in Reed sought a "substantial relationship" between the classification
and the purpose of the legislation and denominated sex an arbitrary classification. 404
U.S. at 76. That the Court was on the verge of finding sex a suspect classification is
apparent from its recent decision in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). See
note 20 supra.
43476 F.2d at 815-18. See Des Plaines v. Trottner, 34 Ill. 2d 432, 216 NXE.2d 116
(1966); Kirsch Holding Co. v. Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 281 A.2d 513 (1971). In Troitner
full discussion of the equal protection question was precluded by a finding that the
statute exceeded the power delegated by the General Assembly. However, the dicta would
support the majority in Belle Terre. In Kirsch the fear of boisterous and uninhibited
conduct by groups of single, unrelated lessees inspired a statute similar to that in Belle
Terre. The ordinance was found unconstitutional. See Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v.
Margate City, 112 N.J. Super. 341, 271 A.2d 430 (App. Div. 1970). Contra, Palo Alto
Tenants Union v. Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
44 476 F.2d at 816.
45 Id. (emphasis added). See note 95 infra.
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Judge Timbers dissented, objecting to what he believed was a
"sliding scale" analysis by the majority.4 Although he admitted that
the means used by the Belle Terre ordinance were not perfectly suited
to its purpose, Judge Timbers did not find them unconstitutionally
over-inclusive, nor did he indulge in the majority's speculations as to
better means to attain the same ends. While recognizing that there
appeared to be a movement away from the rigid "two-tiered" scheme,
Judge Timbers believed that it should not be applied in the "unchartered area" of zoning.4 7 However, if it were to be applied, Judge
Timbers would have used the new formula in a more restrained
manner and on a less extensive basis than, in his view, the majority
had. He interpreted the majority's view as mistakenly dependent on
the Baird and Reed decisions which implemented the balancing aspect
of strict scrutiny.48 Judge Timbers saw the means scrutiny test most
clearly illustrated by the decisions in James v. Strange,49 Jackson v.
Indiana,50 Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 51 If applied at all, he
would use the new test only to make "narrow value judgments," 52 i.e.,
to mechanically ascertain rationality of means, rather than the rationality of ends as is done in the minimum scrutiny test. 58 Accordingly,
Judge Timbers felt that the Belle Terre ordinance substantially contributed to a legislative objective and did not violate the equal protection clause.5 4
Subsequent to the panel's decision in Belle Terre, a poll of the
judges to rehear en banc resulted in a 4-4 vote, and rehearing was
at 821 (Timbers, J., dissenting).
at 822.
48 The traditional equal protection test would preclude judicial inquiry unless the
"legislature's classification scheme is so palpably arbitrary that the court cannot conceive
of any constitutionally permissive objective to which it might rationally be related."
Comment, The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARv. L. Rxv. 1, 62 (1970). The test of
James, Jackson, and Weber would permit intervention whenever the means are not
substantially related to a legitimate end. See notes 39-42 and accompanying text supra.
The Court has exhibited some hesitancy in expanding application of the new standard.
See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Lindsey v. Normat, 405 U.S. 56 (1972);
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971). The question in Lindsey was the constitutionality of Oregon's forcible entry and wrongful detainer statute. In response to appellant's
request for a stricter standard of review than minimum scrutiny, the Court said that
"the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill."
405 U.S. at 74.
49 407 U.S. 128 (1972).
80 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
51406 U.S. 164 (1972). For a discussion of the test as applied in James, Jackson, and
46 1d.
47 Id.

Weber see note 39 supra.

52Judge Timbers did not believe that Baird and Reed were representative of the
new test, nor that a sliding scale approach should be used on the facts of Belle Terre.
476 F.2d at 820-21 (Timbers, J., dissenting).
53

See note 24 supra.

54 476 F.2d at 824 (Timbers, J., dissenting).
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denied.

5

The Supreme Court, however, has since noted probable

jurisdiction.5 6
Belle Terre is in the vanguard of a Second Circuit trend advocating a third equal protection test.57 The court seemed to vacillate

between the intensified "minimum scrutiny" test of James, Jackson,
and Weber 58 and the almost strict scrutiny approach of Baird and
Reed.5 9 Despite the absence of a clear judicial statement upon which
to base the third test,60 the court formulated a "substantial basis" test,
whereby, even if there is a legitimate objective, the means employed
must substantially advance the legislative purpose. The Belle Terre
ordinance was deemed to have failed this test."
Although the Belle Terre court articulated and applied the intermediary equal protection test, the decision turned on the lack of a substantial relationship between the ordinance and the police power of the
village. 62 While this approach may be interpreted along equal protection lines, it is suggestive of a substantive due process analysis.6 3
55 Id.
5642 U.S.L.W. 3213 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1973) (No. 73-191).
57 See, e.g., Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1973); City of New York v.
Richardson, 473 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3655 (U.S. June 19,
1973) (No. 1451); Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973).
Judge Kaufman, in City of New York v. Richardson, commented on the uncertainty
prevalent in this area: "Clearly, these decisions [Reed, Baird, Weber] seem to foreshadow
an expanded judicial inquiry under the Equal Protection Clause, although the outer
boundary of that inquiry remains ambiguous." 473 F.2d at 931. There, the test was
described as one of a sliding scale. However, the context in which the case reached the
Second Circuit did not require the court to implement that test. See p. 287 infra for
detailed treatment of City of New York v. Richardson.
58 See note 39 supra.
59 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1972).
60 See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1973),
wherein Mr. Justice Marshall said:
Opinions such as those in Reed and James seem drawn more as efforts to shield
rather than to reveal the true basis of the Court's decisions. Such obfuscated
action may be appropriate to a political body such as a legislature, but it is not
appropriate to this Court Open debate of the basis for the Court's action is
essential to the rationality and consistency of our decisionmaking process. Only
in this way can we avoid the label of legislature and ensure the integrity of
the judicial process.
Id. at 110 (dissenting opinion).
61476 F.2d at 816-17. As a result of its vagueness, Judge Timbers interpreted the
majority's approach as a sliding scale measure, see id. at 821 (Timbers, J., dissenting).
62476 F.2d 814.
63 The concept of substantive due process is an elusive term referring to substantive
rights which are not expressly delineated in the Bill of Rights, but which are considered
inherent in the fourteenth amendment's concept of "liberty." See, e.g., Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US. 479 (1965).
A "substantial relationship" has traditionally been a standard of inquiry under the
due process clause. See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 US. 365 (1926).
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Nevertheless, the Second Circuit decided to confine itself to the equal
protection issue and framed its decision accordingly.
In several recent cases, the Supreme Court, rather than give the
64
The most explicit
third test its imprimatur, has simply avoided it.
example of this approach is San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez.65 There, after explaining in detail why there was no basis
for strict scrutiny, 66 the Court invoked the traditional rational basis
test.6 7 In light of this uncertainty, the decision of the Second Circuit
represents a bold move forward.
Conceivably, the Belle Terre court may have had a stronger basis
for its holding under either of the established equal protection tests.
Had the court of appeals analyzed the case under the "two-tiered" approach, it could have considered more intensely the possible fundamental rights adversely affected by the zoning ordinance. By penalizing
three or more unrelated persons for living together in a single house,
the ordinance directly infringes the freedom of such persons to live
with whomever they choose. The analysis then could have focused on
whether the associational right involved is of constitutional proportions.
In NAACP v. Alabama, s Mr. Justice Harlan announced, for a
unanimous court, that "freedom to engage in association for the
advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the liberty
assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which embraces freedom of speech." 6 9 He went on to state that it was
"immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association
pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural matters ... .
While freedom of association does not permit a person to ally himself
with others for the pursuit of criminal activities, he is protected when
64 San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Salyer
Land Co. v. Tulare Water Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973); McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263
(1973). In McGinnis the Court surprisingly cited James to support the minimum scrutiny
test: "When classifications do not call for strict judicial scrutiny, this is the only approach
consistent with proper judicial regard for the judgments of the Legislative Branch."
Id. at 276. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683 (1973); United States v. Kras,
409 U.S. 434, 446 (1973).
65411 U.S. 1 (1973). The issue here was whether school funding based on an ad
valorem property tax unconstitutionally discriminated against less affluent districts.
66 Id. at 18-44. The Court gave three reasons: (1) there was no "definable" class
discriminated against, hence no suspect classification; (2) education is not included in the
restricted class of fundamental interests; and (3) as a question of local fiscal policy, it
is not an area in which strict scrutiny may be used.
67 Id. at 40. Justice Marshall, dissenting, advocated use of the sliding scale standard
of review. Id. at 102-03.
68357 U.S. 449 (1958).
69 Id. at 460.
70 Id. at 460-61.
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his associational activities are lawful.7 ' Although the Supreme Court
cases involving this freedom have involved membership in associations
which advocate specific beliefs, 72 were the right given general scope it
would encompass group membership where the advancement of ideas
is not necessarily the raison d' tre.7 3
In Belle Terre, the six unrelated students were exercising a right
of personal association. They were not banding together for the purpose of advocating political or economic beliefs, but rather for the
purpose of forming an economically advantageous housekeeping unit.
On the other hand, their association could also be seen as an expression
of their attitude concerning lifestyle- one which does not view the
traditional nuclear family as the only legitimate association to be
housed under one roof.7 4
Although the Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the issue
whether unrelated persons such as those in Belle Terre fall within the
purview of freedom of association, the Court was recently presented
with a classification issued by the Secretary of Agriculture which drew
a similar line of demarcation between traditional families and "voluntary" families. In United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,7 5
the Court struck down an agency regulation under the Federal Food
71 See Bruns v. Pomerlau, 319 F. Supp. 58, 64-65 (D. Md. 1970); Eberhart v. Massell,
311 F. Supp. 654, 658 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
72 See generally Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74
YA~u L.J. 1 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Emerson]. The recent case of Healy v. James,
408 U.S. 169 (1972), illustrates the type of associational rights commonly brought within
first amendment protection. A college administration refused to give official recognition
to the Students for a Democratic Society, a campus political organization, thereby denying
the group the use of campus facilities for meetings. In finding an impermissible burden
on the group's associational freedom, the Court reiterated: "Among the rights protected
by the First Amendment is the right of individuals to associate to further their personal
beliefs." Id. at 181 (emphasis added). To date, the Court has not been called upon to
expand freedom of association beyond the more obvious first amendment areas of political
expression.
73 Emerson, supra note 72, at 4-5, 20-21. A federal district court in Maryland has
recognized that the freedom of association covers a wide range of associations. In .Bruns
v. Pomerlau, 319 F. Supp. 58 (D. Md. 1970), a practicing nudist was denied employment
in the city police department solely on the basis of his nudist club membership. The
court granted relief to the rejected applicant, holding that "plaintiff's private, nonpolitical association with those who espouse nudism should be no less protected than
associations of a political nature." Id. at 68. Chief Judge Northrop stressed that "the
Fourteenth Amendment protects all persons, no matter what their views or means of
expression." Id. at 64-65. See also Roberts v. Clement, 252 F. Supp. 835 (E.D. Tenn.
1966), where the concurring judge expressed his conviction that private nudist colonies
fall within the protection of freedom of association. Id. at 849 (Darr, J., concurring).
74 Such a form of expression would be easier to identify, perhaps, where the group
is a "hippie commune." See All in the "Family": Legal Problems of Communes, 7 HALv.
Crv. RIGHTs-CIv. Uis. L. RIv. 393, 414-15 (1972).
7593 S. Ct. 2821 (1973).
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Stamp Act which limited the distribution of food stamps to household
units consisting only of "related" persons. The Court held that a
classification which discriminated against household units of "unrelated" persons was arbitrary and unreasonable. 76 By applying the
rational basis test, the Moreno majority found no need to question
whether the associational rights of unrelated persons had been violated. 77 In a concurring opinion, however, Mr. Justice Douglas ad-

dressed the issue directly, holding that minimum scrutiny was
inappropriate since the case involved the right of association:
The "unrelated" person provision of the present Act has an
impact on the rights of people to associate for lawful purposes with
whom they choose. When state action "may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate" it "is subject to the closest scrutiny."78
Justice Douglas viewed the association as a banding together for the
purpose of combatting "the common foe of hunger" and other economic adversities: "This banding together is an expression of the right
of freedom of association that is very deep in our traditions."7 9 Similarly, the Belle Terre students pooled their individual resources for
the purpose of acquiring economical housing. To be sure, their financial problems were not as acute as those of the appellees in Moreno,
but their interest in associational rights, i.e., furthering their personal
"beliefs" in an unorthodox social and economic lifestyle, would appear
to be the same.
Closely related to freedom of association is the right of privacy.
Indeed, when, in Griswold v. Connecticut,80 the right of privacy was
held to be constitutionally guaranteed, it was viewed as a "penumbra"
which emanated, in part, from the associational rights of the first amend76 Assuming a legitimate governmental purpose, i.e., the provision of food for indigents, the means bore no rational relationship to the goal. Both related and unrelated

persons are similarly situated in respect to nutritional needs, and if the government was
seeking to deter fraudulent claims, it selected an unreasonable means of doing so. Id. at
2825-27. Although the Court applied minimum scrutiny, it stressed that if the purpose
of the legislation had been to prevent a politically unpopular group, such as a hippie
commune, from acquiring food stamps, then the statute would be per se unconstitutional.
Id. at 2826. There was testimony to the effect that the statutory classification was aimed
at hippies, but the Court cloaked the congressional purpose with a presumption of innocence. Id.
77The district court had stressed that freedom of association and right of privacy
in the home could not be infringed if the "hypothesized" purpose of Congress had been
the regulation of morality. Moreno v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 345 F. Supp.
310, 314 (D.D.C. 1972).
78 93 S. Ct. at 2831.
79 Id. at 2829.
80 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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ment.81 Lest any lingering doubts be entertained about the independent nature of the right, the majority declared in Roe v. Wade 2
that the right of privacy was "founded in the fourteenth amendment's
concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action."83 To
date, the right of privacy has provided a shield against governmental
interference with "the personal intimacies of the home, the family,
marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing."' 4
Possibly two of these "zones of privacy," namely, marriage and the
home, are touched upon by the Belle Terre ordinance. Eisenstadt v.
Baird,8 5 in which the denial of contraceptives to unmarried persons
was deemed a violation of equal protection, strongly suggests that marriage is not the only personal relationship with a claim on the right of
privacy. Although the Court struck down the law involved because it
created an arbitrary classification,8 6 Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion
stressed that the right of privacy is "the right of the individual, married
or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child."8 Thus posited is a zone of privacy in which the
individual may freely make any decision in the personal realm of
marriage and procreation. 8 The Belle Terre ordinance arguably intrudes upon this zone by requiring that where three or more persons
share a house, at least two of them must be married or related through
family ties. Failure to accept the community's choice regarding marriage or family precludes the individual from living in Belle Terre,
unless he is content to share his house with only one other nonrelated
person.
81 See Note, Privacy in the First Amendment, 82

YALE

L.J. 1462, 1475 (1973). Justice

Douglas, author of the Griswold opinion, has continued to link the right of privacy to
freedom of association:
Mhe First Amendment and the related guarantees of the Bill of Rights . . .
create a zone of privacy which precludes government from interfering with private
clubs or groups. ...

Government may not tell a man or woman who his or her

associates must be.
Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179-80 (1972) (Douglas & Marshall, J.J., dissenting).

82410 U.S. 113 (1973).
83 Id. at 153. The Wade majority makes explicit that which was implied in Griswold,
i.e., that the right of privacy is an element of substantive due process. The right is nowhere mentioned in the Constitution, yet it is given effect through the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment.
84 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S. Ct. 2626, 2639 (1973).

85405 U.S. 438 (1972).
88 See note 42 supra.

87 405 U.S. at 453.
88 Of course, all fundamental rights may be circumscribed by a compelling state in-

terest as the Court made clear in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The woman's otherwise
private decision to have an abortion was held subject to state regulation after the first
trimester of pregnancy, since legitimate health factors intervene. Id. at 163.
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A more compelling argument lies in the contention that the ordinance invades the privacy of the home, a clearly-defined private sphere.
In addition to the unreasonable search and seizure provision of the
fourth amendment, the private nature of the home has received special protection from the Supreme Court, most notably in obscenity
9 held that the state may not
cases. Stanley v. Georgia"
prosecute a man
for possession of obscene films in his home. In subsequent cases, the
Court has stated that the Stanley holding "reflects no more than what
Mr. Justice Harlan characterized as the law's 'solicitude to protect the
privacies of the life within [the home],' "0 and that it is "hardly more
than a reaffirmation that a man's home is his castle." 9' 1 While the Belle
Terre ordinance may have only a remote or indirect effect on marital
decisions, its impact on "the privacies of the life within the home" is
more apparent. Traditional zoning, which might legitimately restrict
the maintenance of a boarding house, would be regulating the use to
which the land is put, having a neutral effect on the personal relationships of the building's occupants. In Belle Terre, the legality of the
one-famly dwelling is explicitly defined in terms of the personal rela92
tionship of the dwelling's occupants, and "family" is narrowly defined
in accordance with the social views of the community. The village
would appear to be regulating otherwise lawful associations by peering
into the privacy of the home. 3 Surely the right of association in the
home, regardless of whether the association has the purpose of furthering the personal beliefs of its members, is as worthy of protection as the
right to privately view obscene movies.
Considered either separately, or as a hybrid zone of "associational
privacy," the rights of association and privacy are likely subjects for
strict scrutiny when subjected to equal protection analysis. However,
despite the validity of freedom of association and right of privacy as
conceived and applied in prior cases, the Supreme Court might very
well conclude that in the village zoning context, associational privacy
lacks "fundamental" dimensions. 94 Conversely, if the Court charts a
89 394 U.S. 557 (1969).

90 United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film, 93 S. Ct. 2665, 2668 (1973).
91 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 2640 (1973).
92 See text accompanying note 6 supra.
93 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
94 Such a conclusion would accord with Judge Timber's position: "While appellants'
rights to live together under the same roof free from the intrusion of government are
said to be important, in my view such rights do not rise to the status of 'fundamental
interests.'" 476 F.2d at 822 (Timbers, J., dissenting).
The "social importance" - "fundamental interest" dichotomy was employed by the
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fundamental zone of privacy enveloping non-family associations within
the home, the Village of Belle Terre will be required to show that its
intrusions on this zone are necessary to further a compelling state
interest. 5 Obviously, the ordinance has a greater chance of success if
subjected to minimum scrutiny. No matter which standard of review
is employed, it will be necessary for the Court to reconcile local zoning
power with "the vital relationship between freedom to associate and
privacy in one's associations."9 6
Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)
in distinguishing education from explicit and implicit constitutional guarantees. By reexamining prior equal protection cases, the Court concluded that "social importance is
not the critical determinant for subjecting state legislation to strict scrutiny." Id. at 32.
See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (minimum scrutiny of legislation affecting
welfare); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (right to decent housing not a fundamental interest). Unlike education, welfare, and decent housing, however, freedom of
association and right of privacy are both well-established constitutional guarantees. The
Court would not be "creating" totally new fundamental interests but would merely be
expanding the coverage and substance of two existing rights.
95 The village has advanced a number of rationales in support of the ordinance: (1)
traditional Euclidean zoning objectives, such as the control of population density, noise,
parking, and traffic problems; (2) preservation of the community's existing rent structure,
476 F.2d at 816-17; and (3) the "interest of the local community in the protection and
maintenance of the traditional family pattern ...." 476 F.2d at 815.
In the area of density control, the village justifies the ordinance on the grounds that
traditional families tend to be self-limiting in size while unrelated groups can mushroom
beyond reasonable limits. The court of appeals suggested another way to achieve the same
result, viz., the imposition of a ratio between the number of bedrooms in each house and
a corresponding allowable number of persons. Id. at 817. Noise, traffic, and pollution
problems could be met by limiting the number of automobiles per dwelling unit and by
enforcement of local nuisance laws. Id. The "rent inflation" argument is based on the
fear that a group of individuals with independent sources of income can afford to pay
higher rents than traditional families, thus pricing traditional families "out of the
market." Rent control is the Second Circuit's suggested solution to this problem. Id. In
all of these areas, the same ends can be achieved without resorting to a legislative ciassification that interferes with the personal relationships of a dwelling's occupants.
The third purported governmental interest, preserving the family relationship as
the touchstone of the community, was a primary source of disagreement between the
district court and the court of appeals. While Judge Dooling used this rationale as the
sole basis for upholding the ordinance, the Second Circuit majority felt that "such a
goal fails to fall within the proper exercise of state police power." Id. at 815. Even if
the maintenance of the traditional family can be established as a compelling state interest,
it is doubtful that the Belle Terre ordinance actually furthers this goal. Since two unrelated persons can legally live together, there would be little to prevent the formation of
homosexual household units which are generally viewed as antithetical to traditional
family associations. Cf. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971) (denial of homosexual marriage not a violation of due process).
Although each governmental objective failed to pass the Second Circuit's application
of the rational basis test, a court with a more sympathetic view toward legislative rationality might have reached a different conclusion. At any rate, it is doubtful that the village's arguments would pass muster under the more exacting strict scrutiny test which
requires a showing that the valid state interests cannot be achieved by other, less burdensome means. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972).
96 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).

